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While corporate social responsibility (CSR) is important to economic
development and baseline human rights in countries dependent on extractive
industry revenues, failures in governance-such as the absence of basic
services like health care and electricity- require new strategies and incentives
to encourage governments to play their traditional role more effectively.
Political economic theories of the "resource curse" see the breakdown of a
sense of government accountability to its people as one of the more destructive
aspects of excessive reliance on natural resource rents. The authors look to
recent innovations such as transparency projects that can reinvigorate a sense
of government accountability, among other positive outcomes. The authors
argue that both mandatory and voluntary models of CSR could have an
adverse impact on sustainable development so long as they focus exclusively
on the role of the corporation rather than the on ways corporate investment
might be used to create incentives for a more effective state role.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, record high commodities prices -and record profits for
extractive firms -have brought the failure of many resource-rich countries
to achieve equitable economic development to the forefront. In a country
like Equatorial Guinea, where oil revenues place it second in the world in
terms of GDP per capita,' sixty percent of the population continues to live
on less than one dollar per day.2 In many other resource-rich countries,
development of the mineral sector has also failed to result in any
meaningful improvement of living standards for the majority of citizens,
often making non-extractive sectors and society as a whole worse off.3 An
increasing number of researchers and activists across disciplines have
turned their attention toward this seeming paradox, commonly referred to
as the "resource curse." Efforts to identify and address the causes of the
resource curse have produced a number of theories. The dominant
understanding of this phenomenon emphasizes that dependence on
natural resource rents impedes the development and proper functioning of
state institutions. It is a political and economic phenomenon, at the heart
of which is the diminution of governmental accountability to its people.
This lack of accountability and failure of state capacity underlie many of
the problems commonly observed in countries that are heavily dependent
on the extractive industries -problems ranging from inadequate protection
of human rights and the environment to the unavailability of essential
services and infrastructure.
Extractive companies operating against the backdrop of resource curse
dynamics are often caught in the middle, as they search for ways to both
avoid blame for these state failures and mitigate their impact. Corporate
social responsibility (CSR) is an umbrella term covering the variety of
means by which companies seek to respond to these demands. In this
paper, we explore how improved understanding of the resource curse
should transform CSR theory and practice. We argue that a CSR agenda
that focuses on the more observable needs of extractive communities to the
exclusion of engagement with the extractive industry's impact on state
institutions and behaviors is inadequate at best and may well be
detrimental to long-term economic and social development. While the
creation of unsustainable dependencies is a risk that CSR programs face in
any sector, we argue that the risks are greater in the context of the
extractive industries because of the dynamics of the resource curse. In
1. INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:GLOBALIZATION AND INEQUALITY
219 (2007), available at http:/ / www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ ft/ weo/ 2007/02/ pdf/ text.pdf.
2. INT'L MONETARY FUND, REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA: 2006 ARTICLE IV
CONSULTATION STAFF REPORT 25 (2006) available at
http: / / www.imf.org/ external/ pubs/ ft/ scr/ 2006/ cr6233.pdf.
3. See generally Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
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making this argument, we focus on the theoretical underpinnings of CSR
and on what research into the complex phenomenon of the resource curse
may tell us about future directions for CSR theory and practice.
Part II looks at the evolution of the concept of CSR, and Part III gives
an overview of research into the political economy of the resource curse.
Part IV looks more closely at the interactions of these two bodies of
literature, concluding that CSR should address the key issues of
governance and accountability in resource-rich states by incorporating
support for the social contract between people and states. Part V explores
the practical implications and limits of this conclusion, arguing that an
emphasis on transparency -both on a voluntary basis and through support
for compulsory state-wide initiatives -ought to form the cornerstone of
extractive industry CSR programs. This section then looks more closely at
resource-rich states' troubling failure to consistently capture an adequate
share of their resource rents, concluding that this failure highlights the
limitations on CSR's ability to address some of the root causes of the
resource curse.
II. WHAT IS CSR?
Contemporary notions of CSR are in many ways a direct challenge to
Milton Friedman's exhortation that "there is only one social responsibility
of business: to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits .. .. "4 The growing recognition that corporations are an
integral part of society and play an important role in the development of
the communities in which they operate has driven CSR proponents of
different stripes to define the proper contours of the business-society
relationship. These efforts have led to widespread acceptance of the
concept of CSR, despite a lack of consensus on what exactly it entails.5
Definitions of CSR have evolved over time, with the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) initially defining CSR as
business behaving ethically while contributing to the economic
development of its employees and the broader community,6 and
subsequently changing the definition to incorporate notions of businesses'
commitment to "contribute to sustainable development," 7 a notion also
reflected in the World Bank's working definition.8 Other definitions of CSR
4. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970, at 124.
5. See, e.g., Bede Nwete, Corporate Social Responsibility and Transparency in the Development
of Energy and Mining Projects in Emerging Markets: Is Soft Law the Answer?, 8 GERMAN L.J. 311,
312-15 (2007).
6. Michael Blowfield & Jedrzej George Frynas, Setting New Agendas: Critical Perspectives on
Corporate Social Responsibility in the Developing World, 81 INT'L AFF. 499, 501 (2005).
7. Id.
8. See HALINA WARD, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PRACTICE OF THE WORLD BANK
GROUP, PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES IN STRENGTHENING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: TAKING
STOCK 3 (2004), available at http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/1601411ED.pdf.
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have integrated the concept of the "triple bottom line," which posits that a
corporation's mandate should encompass financial, social and
environmental performance goals.9
Unsurprisingly, CSR means different things to different groups, with
companies unlikely to share the same view as NGOs, and researchers likely
to take a different tack than practitioners. For some, CSR consists of
voluntary activity or the implementation of international codes of conduct,
while others see a role for regulations and hard law in the CSR landscape.
CSR can demand direct engagement with local communities or simply
require adoption of a particular philosophical approach to doing
business.'0  CSR can represent a free-market-friendly alternative to
government regulation," or it can posit an obligation on the part of
companies to assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions. 2
Environmental and human rights protections tend to feature heavily in
CSR agendas. 3 Other common projects include the construction of health
and education facilities, water treatment programs, and infrastructure
projects such as roads and bridges.4
Whatever its definition, CSR has been embraced by a wide variety of
companies today, particularly multinational extractive companies, as a
means to achieve a variety of largely laudable objectives. Whereas these
programs once focused primarily on public relations vis-A-vis home
country shareholders, consumers and activists, 11 CSR programs
increasingly rely upon a broader stakeholder concept, targeting the
relationship between the company and the community in which it
operates. Current CSR trends reveal a gradual move away from
9. Cynthia Williams & Ruth Aguilera, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Comparative
Perspective, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 452, 466 (Andrew
Crane et al., eds. 2008).
10. See Daniela Ebner & Rupert Baumgartner, The Relationship Between Sustainable
Development and Corporate Social Responsibility 7 (Sept. 4-5, 2006).
11. See Blowfield & Frynas, supra note 6, at 502.
12. See Frederick Bird & Joseph Smucker, The Social Responsibilities of International Business
Firms in Developing Areas, 73 J. Bus. ETHICS 1, 6 (2007).
13. E.g. SHELL, THE SHELL SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2005 (2005), available at
http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/servicepages/welcome.html; BRITISH PETROLEUM,
BRITISH PETROLEUM SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2006 (2006), available at
http://www.bp.com/downloading.do?categoryid=9010741&contentid=7022970;
CONOCOPHILLIPS, 2006 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.conocophillips.com/NR/rdonlyres/ B19COOAC-6154; EXXONMOBIL, 2006
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT (2006); CHEVRON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2006);
FREEPORT McMORAN COPPER & GOLD INC., THE ELEMENTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
2005 WORKING TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2005), available at
http://www.fcx.com/envir.report.htm; NEWMONT MINING, Now & BEYOND: CORPORATE
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT (2005), available at http://www.beyondthemine.com.
14. See, e.g., EXXON, supra note 13, at 44-46; CONOCOPHILLIPS, supra note 13, at 52-55;
FREEPORT McMORAN, supra note 13, at 5.
15. These concerns play an especially important role in CSR in the extractive industries in
light of the high profile disasters and conflicts-such as the ExxonMobil Valdez spill, the
Bhopal explosion and the execution of Nigerian activist Ken Saro-Wiwa-that have brought
increased scrutiny on their operations. Chris Marsden, The New Corporate Citizenship of Big
Business: Part of the Solution to Sustainability, 105 Bus. & SOC. REV. 9, 10 (2000).
[Vol. 11
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headquarters-based CSR programs toward greater engagement at the
community level.' 6 This shift in focus has been driven by increasing interest
on the part of companies in their role in sustainable development (an
interest reflected in the changing definitions of CSR) and, perhaps more
significantly, by their interest in fostering more stable operating
environments through CSR activities aimed at placating communities or
mitigating locally manifest externalities.
CSR is not without its critics. To put it bluntly, there are those that
believe CSR goes too far and those that believe it does not go far enough or,
rather, is misdirected. Those in this latter category often point out that CSR
agendas reflect the concerns of stakeholders in high-income countries, and
as such do not address the problems that truly need addressing.17 The
move toward more inclusive stakeholder approaches has mitigated this
dynamic to some extent, but there is no lack of anecdotal evidence
supporting the idea that companies' engagement with local communities is
often a flawed process.'8 Others in this camp believe that current CSR
practices do not adequately take into account the most important effects of
business activity on local communities but, rather, divert attention from
them. 9 This may be a result of deliberate "greenwashing," or pursuing
projects for public relations purposes with no intention of addressing real
needs, or it may be from a lack of effort or understanding. Critics of
current CSR practices argue that often projects are not directed at the most
significant externalities of the relevant companies' economic activity.20 For
16. For example, in its Sustainability Report in 2005, Shell wrote:
We have changed how we manage our social investment. We are
focusing our programmes increasingly on responding directly to issues
linked to our business. Since we are not community development
experts, we form partnerships with people who are - development
NGOs, international agencies and national organisations. We encourage
local communities to be closely involved in designing and running
projects.
SHELL, supra note 13, at 23-24.
17. See Ward, supra note 8, at 7-8.
18. See Jedrzej George Frynas, The False Development Promise of Corporate Social
Responsibility: Evidence from Multinational Oil Companies, 81 INTL AFF. 581, 584-85 (2005). In
CSR literature, one finds significant criticism of how corporations engage with these
communities. Some argue that company relationships with communities have tended to be
limited in scope and include short visits to elicit requests for specific assistance. Others argue
that, for the sake of time and expediency, companies have made certain assumptions about
the community, including what defines the actual community and who has authority to
negotiate with the company, and have perhaps overlooked things such as conflicts of interests
or questions of legitimacy of community leaders. See, e.g., Paul Kapelus, Mining, Corporate
Social Responsibility and the "Community": The Case of Rio Tinto, Richards Bay Minerals and the
Mbonambi, 39 J. Bus. ETHICS 275, 282 (2002).
19. See, e.g., MANUEL RIEScO, U.N. RES. INsT. FOR Soc. DEV. PAY YOUR TAXES! CORPORATE




20. See, e.g., Frynas, supra note 18, at 587 (outlining some failed CSR projects, such as
unfinished buildings and health clinics without equipment or staff).
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instance, building a town hall or health clinic in a mining community
where the most apparent impact of the mining activity is large-scale
environmental degradation or forced relocation of villages might be
viewed as simply an attempt to buy off the community and create space to
go on with business as usual. According to this theory, any CSR program
that fails to address the most obvious negative consequence of the activity
is insufficient and willfully off-point."'
CSR projects emphasize discrete measurable outcomes (which are
more easily evaluated and publicized and may offer significant
psychological benefits for employees and managers) 22 and are often not
focused on longer term, more complicated problems. Discrete issues are
easier to tackle, less daunting, and better suited to the management
strategies of multi-national companies. Another aspect of direct
community engagement-though one we are reluctant to label a pitfall-is
that local communities are understandably focused on their immediate
needs, such as access to water, medical care, and education. 23 These may
very well be the most pressing needs of a community; however, durable
solutions require striking at the root of the problem, which often lies in the
incapacity and lack of accountability of government. The (very visible)
absence of basic requirements in extractive communities is indicative of a
more fundamental disease pervading resource-rich states. We explore this
idea and its implications in the remainder of this article.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE RESOURCE CURSE
A great deal has been written about the paradoxical inverse
relationship between natural resource wealth and development in poor
countries. While the discovery of vast amounts of natural resources offers
hope that such wealth will lead to greater development, far too often, this
is not the case. Resource-rich countries almost invariably develop more
slowly than non-resource-rich countries.2 4 Moreover, they are more
susceptible to the outbreak of internal conflict, 25 may experience greater
21. See Ralph Hamann, Corporate Social Responsibility and its Implication for
Governance: The Case of Mining in South Africa 16 (2003) (paper presented to Oikos PhD
Summer Academy), available at http://www.oikos-
stiftung.unisg.ch/academy2003/paper hamann.pdf (describing field interviews with local
community members affected by a mine, who expressed concerns that CSR efforts were not
tackling the root causes of the social problems in the area- many of which related to the mine
itself-and thus the CSR practices were seen as insufficient in the face of the negative impacts
of the mining activity).
22. See Frynas, supra note 18, at 586 (stating that one of the many motivations for CSR is a
company's desire to demonstrate to their employees that the company is playing a positive
role in development given that public criticism of companies can be demoralizing for staff).
23. Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Introduction to Escaping
the Resource Curse 1, 3-14 (Macartan Humphreys et al. eds., 2007).
24. See Sachs & Warner, supra note 3, at 4-10.
25. See Macartan Humphreys, Natural Resources, Conflict and Conflict Resolution, 49 J.
[Vol. 11
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levels of corruption, 26 and generally have weaker democratic institutions.27
And while certain segments of resource-rich societies have quite clearly
benefited greatly from the exploitation of mineral resources, the high
degree of inequality in such countries points to the fact that most have not.
At the same time, the biggest success stories in the developing world, for
example, the Asian Tigers, are comparatively poor in natural resources.
Early explanations for this paradox focused on largely economic
factors, namely the effects of commodity price volatility and the Dutch-
disease phenomenon. Volatility in commodities markets causes the export
earnings of resource-rich countries to vary drastically over time. Volatility
in income, some theorists argue, hinders long-term planning and is often
accompanied by a "boom-bust" pattern of expenditures wherein "the
benefits in the good years are transitory whereas the problems generated
during the bad years endure."2" Research on this point, however, is not
conclusive.2 9  The Dutch Disease model, another largely economic
explanation, describes a pattern wherein booms in one sector draw
resources from other sectors while at the same time reducing
competitiveness through real exchange rate appreciation. The Dutch
Disease dynamic is widely observed, 30 but researchers have come to
question its explanatory power, especially in the developing country
context.31 The fact that a range of policy tools exists by which governments
can mitigate the effects of Dutch Disease-such as monetary sterilization,
tight fiscal policies, or temporary subsidies to agricultural and
manufacturing sectors32-also suggests that it is not the primary
explanation for the resource curse. Indeed, the repeated failure of states to
implement these widely known policy tools 33 suggests that economic
explanations, though still important, do not suffice.
More recent research has looked instead at the political economy of the
resource curse, focusing on the effects of mineral wealth on state
institutions and accountability, and on the manner in which dependence
CONFLICT RESOL. 508, 510-13 (2005).
26. See Xavier Sala-i-martin & Arvind Subramanian, Addressing the Natural Resource Curse:
An Illustration from Nigeria 5-6 (Dep't Economics, Columbia Univ., Working Paper No. 0203-
15, 2003), available at http://digitalcommons.libraries.columbia.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1081&context=econ-dp.
27. See Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POLITICS 325, 356-57 (2001).
28. Humphreys, et al., supra note 23, at8.
29. For a good overview, see Michael Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51
WORLD POL. 297, 297-322 (1999).
30. See, e.g., Humphreys et al., supra note 23, at 5.
31. See Ross, supra note 29, at 305-07. Ross notes that the Dutch Disease model assumes
full utilization of a country's capital and labor supply before the resource boom occurs. Id. at
305. In developing countries, where labor surpluses are common, the pull of resources to the
booming sector has less of an effect on the non-booming sectors. Id. In addition, Ross notes
that developing country manufacturers often import intermediate goods, which become
cheaper with exchange rate appreciation, thus mitigating the negative effects of that
appreciation. Id. at 305-06.
32. See id.
33 Humphreys, et al., supra note 23, at 3-14.
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on oil exports shapes state institutions and restrains the range of political
decision-making in ways that inhibit a state's capacity to direct
development.34  Rentier state theory, a central strand of this body of
research, posits a tax-based social contract between citizens and state that is
broken in many resource-rich states.35 According to this theory, taxation
gives citizens the leverage to make demands (i.e., the ability to withhold
financial support) while also increasing their direct stake in the decisions of
government. A largely untaxed citizenry lacks this leverage, leading to
weaker links of accountability between citizen and state, which are crucial
to the development and execution of economic and social policies directed
at the needs and demands of society.
3 6
Because state revenues in resource-rich countries are often largely
disconnected from the success or failure of the broader economy,
governments in these states are not as responsive to the needs of non-
extractive sectors or demands for social investment as states drawing on a
broad tax base.37 Since the bulk of the wealth in resource-rich states
typically accrues to a small number of companies and institutions and the
individuals controlling them, the incentives to build up effective
governance structures to efficiently and equitably manage and distribute
those revenues are weak, especially in the face of competing incentives to
utilize political machinery to capture the rents associated with natural
.resource extraction. Thus, necessary long-term investments, such as
investments in education, often go wanting.
38
While this phenomenon can be present in other single-sector
economies, natural resource-rich countries present an extreme case because
of the typical structure of the extractive sector.39 Thus, for example, the
34. See, e.g., Terry Lynn Karl, Ensuring Fairness: the Case for A Transparent Fiscal Social
Contract, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 256, 259 (Macartan Humphreys et al. eds., 2007)
("Petro-states suffer from a double perverse effect: their states, so often formed during the
period of oil extraction, are skewed by the imperatives of resource extraction, but the
intensification of the resource dependence that accompanies state-building subsequently
produces even further decay in critical arenas such as non-mineral-based revenue raising,
expenditure patterns, fiscal accountability, and citizen participation.").
35. See, e.g., Mick Moore, Death Without Taxes: Democracy, State Capacity, and Aid
Dependence in the Fourth World, in THE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 82 (Mark
Robinson & Gordon White eds., 1998).
36. See generally Hossein Mahdavy, The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in
Rentier States: The Case of Iran, in STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 428
(M.A. Cook ed., 1970); Hootan Shambayati, The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of
Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran, 26 COMP. POL. 307 (1994) (concluding that
reliance on rents leaves states ill-equipped to engage in political negotiations with key
domestic groups).
37. See Humphreys et al., supra note 28, at 12; ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., DEV.
ASSISTANCE COMM., GOVERNANCE, TAXATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY: ISSUES AND PRACTICE 2
(2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/35/40210055.pdf [hereinafter OECD].
38. See Humphreys et al., supra note 28, at 10.
39. See D. MICHAEL SHAFER, WINNERS AND LOSERS: HOW SECTORS SHAPE THE
DEVELOPMENTAL PROSPECTS OF STATES 10, 231-32, 272 (1994). Shafer notes that the extractive
sector in resource-rich states is typically characterized by (1) dominance by a small number of
large firms, (2) high barriers to entry, and (3) high levels of asset specificity, all of which lead
to exceptionally strong rent-seeking behavior by firms and, partially in response to this
[Vol. 11
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great influx of income into the Middle Eastern oil exporters between 1973
and 1983 allowed them to "postpone the creation of alternative
mechanisms for the expression and reconciliation of conflicting economic
claims and interests," making subsequent efforts at reform more difficult.
40
Similar observations have been made about Iran, with theorists arguing
that Iran's financial autonomy allowed it to function without regard to
significant social groups, leaving it unaccustomed to the necessary process
of inter-group negotiation during financial crises.
41
State-citizen accountability in resource-rich states is further diminished
by the ability of power brokers to buy off opposition forces within the
government-and to fund repressive internal security to marginalize
opposition within civil society-with unearned and abundant mineral
rents. 42 This pattern of diminished accountability leads not only to a failure
of will or attention, but also to a failure of core capacity, as the institutions
that facilitate a sense of accountability (for example, a bureaucratic taxing
authority) atrophy or fail to develop.43 Thus, there is an element of path-
dependency that makes the task of eventual reform ever more
challenging.44
Corruption also plays a key role in the resource curse and is a central
feature of the political economic theories discussed above. While
corruption is observed in practically any political or economic system,
corruption in resource-rich countries has tended to be especially
entrenched and pernicious. Corruption flourishes in environments where
there is vast wealth to be distributed by a relatively small number of
individuals in an environment characterized by high levels of secrecy.
Where information about the size of oil or mineral wealth endowments in a
country is typically protected (e.g., by confidentiality clauses in contracts),
and the terms of agreements for the monetization of those endowments are
similarly withheld from public scrutiny, opportunities for corruption are
vast.45 Such secrecy, more so than in other sectors, is the norm in the
extractive industries. 46 Further, the weak institutional environment in
many resource-rich states makes corruption that much easier.
One last factor in the resource curse worth mentioning (which we
return to in more detail in Part V) is the effect of weak institutions on the
ability of the government to collect fair value from its natural resources.
pressure, a tendency for states to offer high levels of protection to the industry.
40. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State, 27
COMP. POL. 1, 19 (1994).
41. See Mahdavy, supra note 36, at 467.
42. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 37, at 2-4.
43. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 35, at 106.
44. See generally TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND PETRO
STATES (1997).
45. See, e.g., Paul Ocheje, The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): Voluntary
Codes of Conduct, Poverty and Accountability in Africa, 8 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. IN AFR. 222, 225
(2006), available at http://www.jsdafrica.com/Jsda/Fal12006/PDF/
Arc_the%20Extractive% 201nd ustries% 20Transparency%20Initiative.pdf.
46. See Karl, supra note 32, at 265-69.
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Power imbalances at the negotiating table very often result in unfavorable
deals being struck,47 and states afflicted by the resource curse typically lack
the institutional capacity to prevent cheating in the collection of revenues.
48
Both of these failures rob states of valuable resources, thus handicapping
efforts to translate those resources into development.
For purposes of this article, which addresses the role of corporations in
resource-rich countries, the salient feature of the resource curse is the fact
that the institutional failure is, at its heart, dynamic and self-reinforcing. It
is both an outcome and a variable, with the weakness attributable to
resource-rent dependence leading to ever greater dependency through the
progressive weakening of institutions.49 This vicious and also dynamic
cycle helps to explain the intractability of the resource curse and highlights
the need for concerted effort on the part of all stakeholders in the extractive
industries.
IV. INTERACTION OF CSR AND THE RESOURCE CURSE
Resource curse theories suggest that CSR practitioners cannot treat
institutional weakness and underlying political dynamics in natural
resource-dependent states as merely conditions of the operating
environment; they are more appropriately seen as targets of CSR in their
own right. The more immediately apparent problems in mining
communities can thus be viewed, to some extent, as second-level
consequences of the extractive activity, attributable at least in part to
institutional failures at a systemic level. With a better understanding of the
political economy of resource-rich countries, the lack of safe drinking water
can be seen not only as the direct result of the polluting activity of the local
extractive company, but also, to a great extent, as an indirect result of
government failure to properly regulate environmental practice.
50
Likewise, inadequacies that may not seem immediately related to the
extractive activity in a given community -such as insufficient educational
spending-can be viewed as indirectly attributable to the breakdown in
government capacity and accountability that comes with dependence on
resource revenues. Thus, any approach to CSR that incorporates notions of
causation and responsibility should account for the role of extractive
companies in resource curse dynamics. As one scholar has argued: "If oil
firms are expected to take responsibility for oil spills, they could equally be
expected to take responsibility for their contribution toward the decline of
non-oil producing sectors of the economy. However, current CSR
approaches do not envisage conferring such a responsibility on firms."51
47. See Humphreys et al., supra note 28, at 4-5.
48. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Vhat is the Role of the State?, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 24,
24 (Macartan Humphreys et al. eds., 2007).
49. See, e.g., Karl, supra note 44, at 342.
50. See., e.g., Frynas, supra note 18, at 596.
51. Frynas, supra note 18, at 587. Some critics might argue that this is precisely the point
of CSR-to distract from more of the fundamental issues. We would say that while there may
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Given the pressures and incentives driving many CSR programs-and
the complexity of resource curse dynamics-is not surprising that such
programs would fail to address the institutional weaknesses at the heart of
the resource curse. Central to the problem is a lack of understanding of the
forces at play, exacerbated, as Blowfield and Frynas argue, by a failure of
will: "Cutting across this absence of a structural understanding is an
inability or unwillingness to consider causality... [i]t does nothing to
encourage examination of the complexity of multilayered, structurally-
rooted problems or the role of business within them."52 Furthermore,
companies face clear incentives to engage in locally-focused, discrete CSR
activities. Discrete projects are more likely to have measurable (or at least
easily understood) outcomes, which of course play best with both home
country and host country constituencies and are often most amenable to
the skills and mindsets of the companies and managers. The incentives to
direct CSR activities toward more systemic issues are less immediately
apparent, but as our understanding of the resource curse grows and an
emphasis on systemic factors becomes embedded in the discourse
surrounding the effects of the extractive industry on society, it seems
logical that CSR theorists and practitioners will have to grapple more and
more with the disconnect between largely localized CSR agendas and the
systemic causes of the resource curse.
The key question is whether CSR agendas that fail to address the
institutional, systemic externalities of extractive activities are simply
inadequate or whether they could actually be harmful. If one assumes that
the range of possible options for a CSR program all target real needs or
varying degrees of significance, it is fair to ask how any assortment of those
options could lead to negative outcomes. There are two ways this could
happen: (1) pursuit of lower-impact CSR activities could "divert" attention
from more significant needs or even undercut the ability of stakeholders to
make additional demands, or (2) a CSR program could actually exacerbate
the institutional weakness underlying the resource curse by usurping
functions more appropriately fulfilled by the state and thereby
undercutting political accountability.
A number of commentators have noted the potential for CSR programs
to distract from more pressing problems, whether unintentionally or by
design. Such criticisms apply more directly to the distinct set of activities
grouped under the heading "corporate philanthropy" - which is
sometimes understood as deliberately designed to "placate community
demands" and "undermine the ability of aggrieved groups to make
political demands which may threaten continued 'goodwill' on the part of
the company"5'-but they are also relevant to .the discussion of CSR
be some truth to these criticisms in certain cases, there is also an argument that the failure to
address these issues reflects not a willful manipulation but rather the state of current CSR
theory. A lack of understanding of the economic interactions and implications may be the real
reason CSR practices are falling short of critics' expectations.
52. Blowfield & Frynas, supra note 6, at 510-11.
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generally.53 Hamann observes that corporate social investments in South
African mining communities have been perceived as failing to "tackle the
root causes of the social problems in the area .. .including, for instance,
employee housing policies." 54 Housing policies may very well rank above
the CSR activities of the companies Hamann describes, but resource curse
theory would suggest that this is not the first order problem. A better
understanding of the resource curse thus informs CSR theory and practice
by allowing for a more accurate ranking of needs, so that core problems are
not ignored for the sake of those more easily addressed.
The distraction paradigm indicates that misdirected CSR may indeed
pose a risk by skewing incentive structures such that demands are not
made. But where the central problem in resource-rich countries is a lack of
institutional accountability, a CSR model that calls for the private sector to
fill governance gaps may be more than a distraction; it may directly impact
state capacity and exacerbate failures of accountability by effectively letting
the state off the hook. As Frynas states,
[I]t is arguable that CSR may provide a lose-lose outcome for a
country's governance: governance failures lead to calls for a role of
CSR in development; usually CSR is unable to pay such a positive
developmental role, but even if CSR could play such a role, this
would ease the pressure on the government to undertake a
developmental role itself.
55
This is a theoretical risk in any sector, but resource curse dynamics
suggest that the risk is greater in resource-rich states. The implications of
this notion for socially conscious extractive companies are troubling.
Understandably, extractive companies face pressure from the communities
in which they operate as they are often the only local actor with the
capacity to provide crucial social goods and services.5 6 Hamann argues
that "citizens may question the government's role as primary service
provider if a locally operating company has greater resources and capacity
and therefore is able to provide goods and services in the near term more
quickly and efficiently than the government.5 7 The danger is that this lack
of confidence may lead to unsustainable dependencies.
We would argue that the "lose-lose" scenario is not inevitable,
however, provided that any agenda of local redress is pursued
53. Peter Newell, Citizenship, Accountability and Community: The Limits of the CSR Agenda,
81 INT'L AFF. 541, 54647 (2005).
54. Hamann, supra note 21, at 16.
55. Frynas, supra note 18, at 596; id. (noting that "even if CSR in the oil industry were to
develop best practices and deliver development effectively, then there would be even less
pressure on governments ... to provide such benefits"); Ward, supra note 8, at 9 (noting the
risk that the CSR agenda can "[distract] from the need to tackle fundamental issues of public
governance").
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concurrently with an agenda aimed at mitigating institutional failures.
Near-term basic needs should certainly be met by whatever means possible
and it would be quite heartless to argue otherwise, provided that the short-
term solutions are not pursued to the exclusion of longer-term efforts to
address systemic issues. In the long run (and extractive industry
investments are often characterized by long investment horizons), any CSR
program must address the institutional issues at the heart of the resource
curse, regardless of what other issues are on the CSR agenda.
V. SETTING CSR AGENDAS: THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESOURCE
CURSE
If CSR programs must, at a minimum, target institutional incapacities
in resource-rich states, the key question is what this means for companies
in practical terms. What role can a company play to facilitate the creation
of the social contract between citizen and state? We would argue that the
social contract requires that citizens have the leverage to demand effective
governance from the state. Where citizens do not have leverage,
government officials may face only weak incentives to govern accountably.
As discussed in Part III, taxation provides a key leverage point in societies
with broad tax bases; in a resource-rich society with a narrow tax base, the
lever of taxes is less powerful. While access to information is vital in both
types of societies in order for citizens to apply their leverage in a targeted
and constructive manner, it is especially important in the latter case, as
weaker weapons demand greater precision. Accordingly, transparency is
absolutely essential to a stable social contract in countries heavily
dependent on extractive industry revenues.
A. Transparency
The lack of governmental accountability at the heart of the resource
curse is facilitated by the lack of information flowing between the
government and the people.58 The lack of transparency of natural resource
revenue flows in many resource-rich developing countries provides cover
for corruption on a massive scale. Between 1997 and 2002, approximately
four billion dollars of oil money went missing in Angola,5 9 and it is widely
suspected that a number of government officials in resource-rich states
have secreted away billions in offshore accounts.60 This flagrant corruption
58. See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INT'L, USING THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION AS AN ANTI-
CORRUPTION TOOL 5 (2006), available at http://www.transparency.org/content/
download/9633/66877/file/T2006_europeaccess-information.pdf.
59. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Angola: Account for Missing Oil Revenues,
Disappearance of U.S. $ 4.2 Billion Undermines Fundamental Rights I Uan. 13, 2004), available
at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/12/angola6925.htm.
60. For instance, Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, is suspected of
divesting some of his nation's considerable oil revenues into a private Swiss bank account.
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could not continue in an environment of disclosure and public scrutiny.
Transparency is a broad concept, encompassing the availability of a
variety of types of information to enable public scrutiny. While
transparency as a rule fosters accountability and good governance,61 we
would argue that transparency of revenue streams and financial
arrangements in the extractive sector is of particular importance for the
prospect of good governance in resource-rich states. The all-too-common
opacity of resource revenues exacerbates the resource curse. If one of the
chief causes of the resource curse is breakdown of government
accountability, transparency arguably represents a practical counterweight
by giving citizens the information they need to make demands on their
government for the responsible dispersal of natural resource revenues. The
availability of information is especially restricted in resource-rich states
where individuals are largely untaxed and thus lack one of the primary
sources of leverage over government decision-making. With the financial
relationship between states and extractive firms laid bare, citizens have the
information necessary to exert pressure on government in order to allocate
its recourses toward poverty alleviation and development programs.
62
Extractive companies have a vital role to play in fostering this
environment of transparency. We argue that support for natural resource
revenue transparency should be central to any CSR program in the
extractive sector, whether that program is designed with an emphasis on
the company's role in development or to address the impact of the firm's
investments. While companies cannot dictate the behavior of sovereign
nations, they can directly impact the social contract between citizen and
state through modification of their own corporate behavior. Some firms,
for instance, have chosen to unilaterally disclose the payments they make
to host governments. 63 Disclosure of key information about a company's
economic relationship with the states can directly impact the links of
accountability by arming citizens with information essential to hold their
government to account.64 Unilateral disclosure can only go so far, of
Steve Levine & John Tagliabue, Swiss Freeze Bank Account Linked to Kazakh President, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1999. Global Witness, a U.K.-based non-governmental organization, has
accused Nazarbayev of taking some U.S. $ 78 million dollars in "kickbacks" from oil
companies in exchange for unspecified favors, and alleges that he controls a "secret fund" in
Switzerland containing over U.S. $ 1 billion dollars. GLOBAL WITNESS, TIME FOR
TRANSPARENCY: COMING CLEAN ON OIL, MINING, AND GAS REVENUES 7-17 (2004), available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/media-library-detail.php/115/en/timejfor_transparency.
61. See, e.g,, U.K. DEP'T FOR INT'L DEV., MAKING GOVERNANCE WORK FOR THE POOR 40
(2006), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/wp2006.
62. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 8, at 8.
63. The Canadian oil company Talisman chose to begin voluntarily publishing their
revenue data because they "believed . .. that an important first step in establishing greater
economic transparency can be achieved through the public disclosure of revenue payments to
host governments." TALISMAN ENERGY, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 36 (2005), available
at http://www.talisman-energy.com/cr-online/2005/econ-transparency.htm; Newmont
Mining, the American mining company also discloses their payments on a country-by-country
basis. Newmont, supra note 13, at 48.
64. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) undertook a
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course, and the ultimate objective must be transparency across all actors in
a given resource-rich state. 65 In this regard, support for international
initiatives aimed at addressing the resource curse through greater
transparency ought to be part of any CSR agenda.
A focal point for the movement to promote greater transparency is the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an international multi-
stakeholder initiative comprised of oil, gas and mining companies,
governments, and civil society. Countries that commit to implementing
EITI require all extractive companies operating within that country to
report their oil, gas and mining payments, which are then reconciled
against reported receipts from the government and made public.66 While
EITI does not lead to complete transparency of revenue flows (a full picture
of the economic relationship between companies and states would require,
for instance, transparency of the underlying contracts), it does place a
significant amount of information in the hands of citizens, which holds
great promise for the creation of a meaningful social contract.
EITI is by nature a voluntary initiative at the state level; but within
implementing countries, compliance with EITI reporting is effectively
mandatory, either carrying the force of law 67 or constituting a de facto
requirement for continued extractive activities. The fact that EITI applies
equally across the extractive sector in an implementing country creates a
level playing field for all the companies, and thus addresses the
disincentives to transparency that companies may face in a context of
purely voluntary disclosure.
A crucial component of EITI, and one that highlights the role that
companies can play in fostering accountable governance, is its requirement
that there be meaningful participation of three stakeholder groups:
governments, companies and civil society.68  In many resource-rich
countries, the development of a robust and free civil society has been
hindered by repressive and authoritarian regimes, the prevalence of which
comparative study on OECD member countries' citizens' access to information, concluding
that "educated well-informed citizens expect governments to take their views and knowledge
into account when making decisions on their behalf." MARC GRAMBERGER, OECD, CITIZENS
AS PARTNERS: OECD HANDBOOK ON INFORMATION, CONSULTATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
IN POLICY-MAKING, 15-16, 18-20 (2001), available at
http://213.253.134.43/oecd/pdfs/browseit/4201141E.PDF.
65. We do not mean to suggest that unilateral disclosure of revenue payments is not
worthwhile. To the contrary, such voluntary disclosure-in addition to getting valuable
information into the public domain-is vital to creating a paradigm shift in the extractive
industries that will enable the emergence of transparency as the norm, rather than the
exception.
66. For a full list of validation criteria, see EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY
INITIATIVE, VALIDATION GUIDE (2006), available at
http://issuu.com/eiti/docs/validationguide.
67. See NEITI Act (2007) (Nigeria) (on file with author). Companies operating in countries
that have signed up to EITI must report as part of their operating procedures.
68 EITI INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY
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is a symptom of the resource curse.69 An active civil society with the
leeway to operate is crucial to the creation of a social contract between
citizens and the state. In mandating the involvement of civil society in the
process, the EITI framework represents a significant step forward in
strengthening the systems of accountability.
While EITI is still too new to draw decisive conclusions about its
efficacy, there are indications that it holds promise. For example, open
budgeting and expenditure transparency are recognized *as powerful
means of fostering state accountability, 70 and even though EITI does not
address expenditures, civil society groups in Ghana and Gabon report that
the increased transparency around revenue streams as a result of EITI has
led directly to more substantive public discussions about where that
money is going. Similarly, groups in the Niger Delta acknowledge that the
information they have obtained through the Nigerian EITI process has led
them to shift their focus from getting the oil companies to pay more to
demanding an accounting from local governments of the large sums they
have received. Time will tell whether these demands result in improved
governance, but indications are positive.
While the onus for implementing EITI is on the governments
themselves, companies play a central role in encouraging countries in
which they operate to implement EITI and to comply with the process once
it is initiated. Equatorial Guinea, a small, oil-rich autocratic nation in
Africa, recently signed on to EITI in no small part due to the
encouragement of ExxonMobil, one of that country's major operators.71
One can only speculate as to ExxonMobil's motivations for playing such a
proactive role, though it is not difficult to understand some of the
incentives that may have driven its decision. Equatorial Guinea is arguably
one of the worst examples of the resource curse and systemic opacity.
72
The President of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, once told
the BBC that information about oil revenues was a "state secret,"73 and it is
easy to understand why he felt this way. With a population of only
69. See, e.g., Humphreys et al., supra note 28, at 11-13.
70. U.N. ECON. COMM'N FOR AFRICA, DEV. POL'Y MGMT. Div., AIDE-MEMOIRE, PUBLIC
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOCUSING ON BEST PRACTICES IN THE
CONTEXT OF BUDGET TRANSPARENCY 2-3 (2005), available at http://www.uneca.org/
dpmd/events/ Aide%20Memoire%20AEGM%20Sept %202005 %20final.doc.
71. In its 2006 corporate citizenship report, ExxonMobil states that it has "played a key
role in assisting countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria in their efforts to
implement EITI." EXXONMOBIL, supra note 13, at 38. Their future plans for 2007-08 include
"[w]ork[ing] with interested governments as they move toward transparency in managing
their oil and gas interests." Id. at 11. "We have engaged in dialogue with the Angolan
government to encourage them to move toward more open and transparent processes in
managing their oil and gas interests." Id. at 38.
72. Equatorial Guinea consistently ranks as one of the most corrupt countries in the
world, according to Transparency International. See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION
PERCEPTIONS INDEX 7 (2007),
http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveys-indices/cpi/ 2007.
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600,000,74 the government of Equatorial Guinea receives an annual income
from oil thought to be nearly U.S. $ 6 billion dollars.75 Despite this
tremendous influx of wealth, the lives of average Equatoguineans are quite
bleak - the vast majority of the population lives in abject poverty without
access to water, health care, or education.72 In 2004, the Senate Permanent
Subconnittee on investigations found that U.S. oil companies had
deposited millions of dollars into the personal bank account of President
Obiang.76 The President owns several mansions in the United States, and
his son purchased one of the most expensive pieces of real estate in history,
a U.S. $ 35 million mansion in Malibu, despite an official salary of only U.S.
$ 5,000 per month.77 Despite this historical aversion to transparency, the
Equatorial Guinean government committed to EITI, and in February 2008,
Equatorial Guinea was admitted as a candidate country. Time will tell
whether implementing EITI and publicly disclosing revenue data will lead
to amelioration of the stark contrast between the enormous oil wealth of
the elite and some of the worst poverty in the world. Equatorial Guinea
has a long road to travel before it will be a fully validated member of EITI
(which requires international auditing of its participation in the process),
but the fact that it has come this far has surprised many and is testament to
how far the acceptance of EITI and the notion of transparency has come. It
is also a testament to the power of individual companies to take steps with
the potential to improve governance and accountability.
Companies participating in EITI and committed to transparency view
it as good for business and as a necessary component of increasing
accountability in a country. In its 2006 Corporate Citizenship Report,
ExxonMobil stated:
Transparency initiatives are designed to increase disclosure of
financial information and are fundamental to good governance.
They can result in greater accountability by government leaders on
how they spend their country's revenues. This helps stabilize the
74. UNITED NATIONS, DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC. WELFARE, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS:
THE 2006 REVISION 58 (2006), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/WPP2006_Highlights-rev.pdf.
75. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: EQUATORIAL GUINEA (2008),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7221.htm.
76. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REPUBLIC OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA: 2006 ARTICLE IV
CONSULTATION STAFF REPORT 8 (2006), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06233.pdf
76. Terence O'Hara & Kathleen Day, Riggs Bank Hid Assets Of Pinochet, Report Says, Senate
Probe Cites Former U.S. Examiner, WASH. POST, July 15, 2004, at A01. The subcommittee went
on to recommend in its report that oil companies be required to publicly disclose their
payments to foreign governments to avoid similar scenarios in the future. Justine Blum, U.S.
Oil Firms Entwined in Equatorial Guinea Deals, Riggs Probe Led to SEC Inquiry on Corruption,
Profiteering, WASH. PoSr, Sept. 7, 2004, at E01.
77. See, e.g., Chris McGreal & Dan Glaister, The Tiny African State, the President's Playboy
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investment climate of a country, which is critical for attracting the
large-scale investments necessary for meeting the world's growing
energy demands. 
78
In addition, transparency may also help companies improve their
relationship with the communities in which they work. It is harder to do
business in a community with disgruntled citizens who see no benefit to
the exploitation of their resources because of government's
mismanagement of natural resource wealth. For example, the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), created in 2006, employs
tactics that include kidnappings and attacks on oil pipelines. Their actions
have reduced oil outputs in the region by roughly one-third.79 At least
500,000 barrels of oil go missing each day.80 At over a U.S. $ 100 a barrel,
the cost to business is easy to calculate. Although the companies are not
entirely to blame for the government's failings, they are easier targets for
the people to focus their energies. They often have more capacity for
change than the government. Transparency, one hopes, can serve to
relieve pressure on companies to some extent and to direct an appropriate
share of it on to governments, thereby fostering a sense of accountability.
Transparency also has reputational and public relations benefits for
companies as they face increased scrutiny from watchdog organizations
and sophisticated networks of activists.8
1
The power of these incentives has led to increased engagement by
companies in the transparency movement. Twenty-one companies have
officially stated their international support for EITI,82 and institutional
investors worth U.S. $ 14 trillion have publicly stated their support for EITI
and transparency, stating that it is in the best interest of business and
investment.83  Company and investor buy-in logically enhances
government incentives to improve transparency, as governments are keen
to cater to the demands of potential investors.
78. EXXONMOBIL, supra note 13, at 40.
79. Stephanie Hanson, Council on Foreign Relations, MEND: The Niger Delta's Umbrella
Militant Group, Mar. 22, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12920/mend.html.
80. Id.
81 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, EITI BUSINESS GUIDE: How
COMPANIES CAN SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION 8 (2008), available at
http://www.eitransparency.org/files/document/EITI%2OBusiness%2OGuide.pdf.
82. For a complete list of which companies have formally endorsed EITI, see
http://www.eitransparency.org/implementingcountries (last visited Apr. 18, 2008). It should
be noted that even companies that have not formally signed up to EITI are willing to disclose.
For example, in Mauritania's recent EITI report, CNPCI (China National Petroleum
Corporation International), which has not formally endorsed EITI, disclosed their payments,
an event previously thought to be highly unlikely. See COMITE NATIONAL INITIATIVE SUR LA
TRANSPARENCE DES INDUSTRIES EXTRACTIVES, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA, RAPPORT
NATIONAL POUR LA TRANSPARENCE DES INDUSTRIES EXTRACTIVES 32 (2005), available at
http://www.cnitie.mr/documentspublic/RapportITIE.pdf.
83. Press Release, EITI Investor Group, Investors Statement on Transparency in the
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While transparency is not a panacea, it does offer hope for improved
governance in resource-rich states. As Karl notes, "[tiransparency is not a
stand-alone tool, and it is only a start. But if it is seen as a prerequisite to
other types of state and market reforms, it promises real payoffs for
managing expectations, reducing social tensions, and providing more
stability."84  Transparency is thus a necessary, but not sufficient,
component of accountability. As a goal of CSR programs, however, it has
certain disadvantages. Because a lack of transparency is not always the
most obvious problem in an extractive community lacking fresh water,
electricity, or basic educational and health services, it may not rise to the
top of the list in a company that has limited resources budgeted for its CSR
program. Transparency is also harder to measure or verify than, for
example, direct provision of health care or infrastructure. It is even less
tangible in many ways than something like improved safety standards,
which will be directly experienced by many members of an extractive
community. However, the fact that improved transparency holds the
promise of indirectly strengthening state institutions that might someday
have the capacity to meet these needs makes it an indispensable part of any
CSR program.
B. CSR and Taxes
Part III touched upon one of the more important ways in which the
institutional anemia central to the resource curse feeds into a vicious circle:
the persistent failure of countries to realize fair value for their natural
resources. Governments very often get less than they should for their
natural resources as information asymmetries and imbalances in the levels
of expertise on negotiating teams can result in bad deals being struck.
Weak fiscal regimes are also a persistent problem and can handicap
governments even before production has commenced.85  During
production, inadequate enforcement of contractual or statutory provisions
may further decrease a government's realized share of resource rents.86
It may seem contradictory to argue, on the one hand, that rent-seeking
activity and the resulting breakdown in systems of accountability are
central to the dynamics of the resource curse and, on the other hand, that a
failure to capture a greater share of rents for the state is also to blame. If
rent seeking within the state lies at the heart of the resource curse, one
might be tempted to argue that increasing the amount of those rents would
only exacerbate the problem. This line of reasoning, however, should not
lead one to conclude that getting a fair deal is not in the best interests of a
country. Mineral resources are, after all, finite; foregone revenues cannot
be recovered. Where it may be perceived as politically infeasible to leave
84. Karl, supra note 34, at 278.
85. See, e.g., Humphreys et al., supra note 28, at 4-5.
86. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 48, at 24-25.
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resources in the ground until such time as institutions for managing their
extraction can be put in place, any government effort to capture a greater
share of mineral rents (for instance, the numerous contract review and
renegotiation processes currently seen throughout Africa and elsewhere)
should be accompanied by serious efforts to strengthen those institutions,
not least through the creation of robust transparency mechanisms. 87
Because the fundamental relationship between extractive companies
and the states in which they operate is an economic one, it is worth
considering how this relationship should inform CSR theory and practice.
Taxes and royalties are at the heart of the relationship between a company
and a government and have more impact on a country than any CSR
project could, but corporate policy around these payments are nonetheless
not included in any CSR plans beyond corporate conduct statements in
support of respect of laws.88  This is not especially surprising. More
interesting is the relative lack of attention paid to taxes in the academic
literature addressing normative concepts of CSR. To be sure, the issue has
not been completely ignored,8 9 but the greater body of CSR literature does
not spend enough time on the question of taxes. Given the centrality of
taxes in the corporate-state relationship, especially in resource-rich
countries, we would argue that more thought needs to be given to the
relative importance of CSR vis-a-vis fiscal policy and practice.90
Companies all over the world employ a number of means, both
87. Karl highlights the difficulties inherent in this approach, looking specifically at the
resource curse in oil-dependent states: "[Miany of the solutions proposed for overcoming the
resource curse, which seem so very promising, are unlikely to work on their own and, instead,
should be put forward as part of a larger process of political reform .... In sum, [these
proposed solutions] require at least some of the very 'stateness' that is lacking in oil
exporters." Karl, supra note 34, at 270-71.
88. See, e.g., Rhys Jenkins, Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty, 81 INT'L
AFF. 525, 538-39 (2005).
89. See, e.g., Riesco, supra note 19, at 23 ("The CSR concept may be enhanced with the basic
consideration that the first responsibility of corporations - particularly foreign corporations
operating in less developed countries - is non [sic] other that [sic] paying their taxes as they
are expected to.").
90. It is worth emphasizing the failure of CSR to address issues of taxation and fiscal
arrangements between governments and companies. This failure is arguably indicative of the
extent to which the debate has been constrained by current paradigms of the stakeholders on
how they approach CSR. See Jenkins, supra note 88, at 538-39. It may also be the case that
company perceptions of CSR are fundamentally at odds with any kind of compromise on tax
minimization strategies. Or perhaps the absence of a meaningful fiscal component in current
CSR theory is a result of CSR's usual place in the corporate structure: CSR programs are often
run out of a separate unit from the core business unit and are not as integrated into core
strategy decisions as they could be. Separating CSR from business functions, it may indicate a
mindset that CSR belongs outside of the realm of the traditional money-making corporate
structure. In many companies, CSR has begun to feature more prominently in high-level
strategy as companies come to understand the importance of an integrated approach. Perhaps
an optimist may say that the logical end point of this trend is for an eventual harmonization of
CSR and core business strategy, but there are reasons to be skeptic as it is unlikely that CSR
would ever supersede the adversarial competitive nature of negotiations and business
practices. We would propose, however, that from a theoretical level, this failure of CSR
theory to say more about taxes deserves a second look.
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legitimate and illegitimate, for minimizing their tax payments.91  The
problem for resource-rich countries is that, for many of the reasons
discussed herein, the systems they have in place for monitoring these
practices and effectively collecting taxes are often anemic as a result of
pervasive institutional incapacity. The challenge facing these weak
institutions is made greater by the financial complexity of the extractive
industries and, significantly, by its lack of transparency. Moreover, the
notion of what qualifies as "legitimate practice" and what does not in
minimizing a tax bill is not cut-and-dry. The use of transfer pricing to shift
tax liabilities out of producing countries is ostensibly a legitimate practice,
but it is also subject to tremendous abuse and can be difficult to monitor.
92
While means exist to facilitate the monitoring of these practices (such as
requirements that companies use advance pricing agreements), such
practices are under-utilized by resource-rich countries.
What, if anything, can CSR do to address such issues? Whereas
transparency offers incentives to businesses as discussed herein, there is
arguably a fundamental misalignment of interests between countries and
companies when it comes to taxes.93  Fiscal arrangements between
companies and countries are generally determined through an adversarial
negotiation process, and it is arguably naYve to propose that CSR
contemplate that companies shoot themselves in the foot. This, perhaps,
points up the fundamental inadequacy of voluntary modes of CSR to
address the major externalities of business operations. The use of strategies
to minimize tax burdens could have a more significant impact on host
countries than any traditional CSR strategy possibly could,94 but the
incompatibility of such concerns with CSR-or at least with any purely
voluntary conception of CSR-highlights the limits of CSR. Nevertheless,
we propose that more research be undertaken to explore the creation of
standards of tax practice that could be included in extractive companies'
CSR programs. To start with, although there appears to be a broad
consensus that outright fraud as a means of minimizing a tax bill is
91. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Gramlich & James E. Wheeler, How Chevron, Texaco, and the
Indonesian Government Structured Transactions to Avoid Billions in U.S. Income Taxes, 17
AccOUNTING HORIZONS 107, 107 (2003); Stiglitz, supra note 48, at 24-25.
92. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 48, at 24-26.
93. Incentives are not necessarily misaligned in all cases. The current wave of mineral
contract renegotiations across Africa and elsewhere highlights the importance of agreeing on
contracts that are "socially and politically stable." "Stabilization" in the context of mineral
contracts usually refers to the mechanisms that lock in, for the life of the contract, the fiscal
and regulatory terms in place at the time of contract signing. Socially and politically stable
contracts, on the other hand, are those that can withstand the pressures that often come with
changes in underlying economic conditions. For instance, windfall profits taxes or royalty
and tax rates that adjust in response to increased commodity prices can provide companies
with some degree of certainty about profitability while assuring states a politically and
socially acceptable share of windfall profits during resource booms. Company and country
incentives may thus be aligned around the creation of more flexible fiscal mechanisms.
Nevertheless, even within the context of this shared interest, company and state incentives are
fundamentally misaligned when it comes to the actual calculation and payment of revenues.
94. See generally Riesco, supra note 19, at 21.
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unethical, there is a significant difference of opinion in the business, law,
and tax policy communities as to where the line between fraud and
acceptable tax planning lies. Thus, work on international tax practice
standards specifically tailored to the extractive industries could be an
important starting point worthy of more discussion.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are other models of corporate social responsibility, beyond
transparency and new thinking on fiscal relationships that have the
potential to foster the development of accountability between a
government and its citizens. For instance, certain modes of public-private
partnership, including jointly managed social development funds where
government is brought into the decision-making process, offer companies a
constructive way to participate in the development agenda. The key is that
such approaches do not cut out government and thereby hinder the
development of a valid social contract. The Economist states it well: "[aill
things considered, there is much to be said for leaving social and economic
policy to governments. They, at least, are accountable to voters."95 This
statement alludes to an important principle: corporations are not-and
should not be required to become -development experts. Rather, they
must not stand in the way of development and should at a minimum
support those initiatives that attempt to address the key development
challenges in the communities in which they operate. In the case of the
extractive industries, this means supporting efforts to create systems of
accountability between government and people. The government must be
brought back into the equation in extractive communities where
longstanding state incapacity has encouraged local groups to look to
companies in order to meet their needs. Ideally, CSR should lead to a more
significant role for governments in the execution of traditional state
functions, starting with more effective capture and management of
revenues and leading to more accountable and responsive expenditure
policies. Transparency will facilitate this, but only to the extent that all the
key members of society, including multinational and local corporations,
support the transparency agenda and help to foster better accountability.
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